Auckland Waterfront Fantastic

I went down to the Waterfront this morning for an opening celebration. There was a Maori Pouwhiri at sunrise. Waka. Classic boats lined the wharves. And so did the people. The public spaces and places down here are a revelation. Auckland has done itself proud. Go there. Walk around. And enjoy....

AMETI Traffic Sewer Still On Track

I was asked to give a lecture on the AMETI project to Masters in Planning students at Auckland University, who are investigating urban design aspects of the Tamaki Transformation project. I wanted to give a bit of the planning history and put what's happening there in a political planning context....

As far back as 1946 the then Ministry of Works had designs on the corridor for a new highway. The goal was to connect the suburbs of Tamaki with Auckland CBD. There were also plans for suburban rail improvements at the time. This graphic I have borrowed from www.transportblog.co.nz.

And the De Leuw Cather work in the 1960's continued the idea of an Eastern Highway - which was clearly marked on their planning maps.

This image taken from Auckland Council's GIS system shows the lay of the land today - and highlights the fact that a transport designation has been in force along most of the proposed highway route for a long time. Much of it is green space. The Eastern Rail line occupies some of the corridor.

From 2002 to 2004 Mayor John Banks floated the idea again of the Eastern Motorway. He even had designs on Ngataringa Point (where I live) for a tunnel. But the main point of this slide is to show the alignment of the proposed Eastern Motorway - connecting Tamaki suburbs with Auckland CBD. Regardless of what happens along the way - how many houses might be removed and so on.

Various resident groups rose up in opposition. Particularly the residents around Hobson Bay who did not want to see that little bit of paradise damaged by such a huge corridor. They made up this computer image of how the whole thing might look running through Hobson Bay. This was the start of strong opposition to Mayor Bank's project. In fact it directly led to his downfall, and to the election of a number of new councillors to Auckland Council in 2004. They reversed the Eastern Motorway Project, and out of this emerged AMETI.

Considerable planning efforts were made to change the emphasis of the project, to promote public transport, cycling and pedestrian amenity. I sat on the South Western/Eastern Corridor Steering Group for 3 years (as ARC's representative) from 2004 to 2007, and advocated for the need to integrate land use planning with changes to transport. This approach was generally supported and appreciated at the time. However Auckland City Council did not handle related plan changes at all well, and the Panmure community in particular became angry, organised, public meetings occurred, and eventually Auckland City Council backed off significant aspects of a residential and commercial intensification project (Plan Change 59 and Plan Change 142). The AMETI project went into recess for a time. It had become very expensive too. What was clear to me throughout, was that traffic engineers from Auckland City and Manukau City had long ago prepared engineering drawings for road widening projects through and around Panmure and Glen Innes. They were keen to get them built. It was always a case of "we need to widen the road to decongest the traffic - and then we'll fix public transport..."

Last year Auckland had local government amalgamation, and the whole AMETI project got tipped into the Auckland Transport CCO. Auckland Transport has been working hard on the project and in April had an open day down at Panmure where various transport designs were shown. I was amazed to see that we now have an "AMETI ROAD". A new road is proposed to decongest traffic. A number of huge "Manukau City" type interchanges are proposed. As shown here. Concern is being expressed about how the public transport dimension will work - for example there is an existing rail service: how will it be interconnected with a proposed busway? Or will it compete? Will a new bypass road draw custom away from public transport infrastructure...?

Around Panmure the design is interesting as shown in these images. A box section is proposed - local arterial road above local arterial bypass below. It is unclear how long this elevated corridor runs but it seems to be 500 metres or so. You can see the cross section proposed. It looks like a creative option, but it's hard to escape the conclusion that "AMETI ROAD" will act as an Eastern Highway. High traffic volumes, and massive severing effects on local communities of Panmure and Glen Innes. Politically what seems to have happened is this: The Eastern Highway idea has never gone away. It keeps getting reborn in different guises. Auckland City Council had a serious attempt at integrating land use planning with transport planning in the mid 2000's, but mis-managed it, not helped by leaky building crisis played out in the headlines. Reaction by community against crappy medium density housing. Then we had amalgamation, and the silo of Auckland Transport created. It has picked up AMETI - but along the way the need to integrate the project with land use changes risks being overlooked. I understand there is a forum of some kind where Auckland Council officials sit down with Auckland Transport officials - but this has all the hallmarks of a project where the road builders have all the money and all the cards. It will be the residents of Panmure and Glen Innes who risk losing out in the long term. They are quiet now because no-one is trying to push medium/high density plan changes on them. These projects do take time. It is essential to bring the community along - not for the ride - but to ensure the best overall outcomes are delivered. AMETI needs to be about integrated outcomes. Auckland does not need another traffic sewer.

And of course no presentation about transport planning at University is complete without a few words from Mumford.

Floods in USA vs Earthquakes in NZ

I'm doing some lecturing in the Planning School of Auckland University at the moment and get to attend some interesting talks from visiting experts. Like Wayne Feiden from Northampton in the US of A. He talked about natural hazard management in the US. It was extremely interesting to learn what happens there. Especially when we know waht has actually happened here in Christchurch. This slide shows the relative incidence of natural disasters across the USA. It appears these statistics are signed at the highest level. Presidential Disaster Declarations. We were advised that flooding is the biggest single cause of natural disasters. I remember all the news about the Mississippi and how those people all just walked away from their houses when they got flooded. You might remember. And none of them were insured....

Wayne showed us a few images from the damage done at New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina. He explained that before the suburbs got built out in New Orleans, there had been large tracts of wetlands which had absorbed the energy of hurricanes in the past. These were the houses that copped the most damage because they were built on low lying land.

He explained how many of these houses were built on low cost low lying concrete foundations - with no room for flood waters to flow beneath - and no height above flood waters either.

Apparently after the flood a high amount of planning and regulation got forced through. Rushed through. Someone had the bright idea of trailer park housing (remember that George Wood), and people and families have been living that way for years. Very poor, damp, humid style of housing. Especially bad in winter. And pretty awful in hot summers also.

But it was Wayne's information about state coverage of flood damage that made me sit up. You can see in this slide that 1% chance of flooding areas are Federally mapped - ie the US of A does that mapping. Not even state governments. These are signed off at the very highest level. And - he said - you cannot get private flood insurance. The US of A has a National Flood Insurance program (sounds a bit like the Earthquake Commission....)

Apparently it is - in theory - a self-supporting fund. But it was the next bit that was very interesting. He described that what comes with the fund is a VERY large carrot (they will cover all the costs of flood damage), and a VERY large stick (you can't qualify for this national flood damage insurance unless local land use regulations and building codes comply with Federal Rules.)

This detail strikes at the heart of what has gone wrong in Christchurch with insurance and EQC cover it seems to me. The EQC pays $100,000 on every house (more or less) doesn't matter if it was built badly, or if it was build on land the Council knew would liquify. There was no incentive in Chch for council's to act appropriately, nor builders, nor developers. Sure some people had a private top up insurance - but they've run a mile now.

I like this slide. He explained that in a very short time, the earthquakes in Chricthcurch will be forgotten. So it is essential to make institutional changes now, while there is an appreciation of what is necessary, and what went wrong. But - as I've indicated before - I wonder whether the Canterbury Inquiry is ready to grasp that nettle.

Council's Relentless Waterfront Sale

"Where is Auckland Council's Waterfront Masterplan?" is the question I asked nobody in particular as I read NZ Herald's apparently innocuous news item about the sale of the Hilton Hotel on Princes Wharf.




The article ran in Granny Herald within the August 3rd Business section.

".....The five-star boutique Hilton Auckland has been put up for sale in an international campaign but its American operator will continue to run it and the property will stay a Hilton.

Dean Humphries, Jones Lang LaSalle Hotels' executive vice-president, who was appointed to sell the property exclusively said Hilton Hotels would manage it for the new owner as part of its operations here, which also include Hiltons at Taupo and Queenstown.

Brian Fitzgerald, an investor, said the property belonged to a number of parties including Willeston Capital.

"It's a great time to sell, never better. You won't sell just because of Rugby World Cup but it's performing well," Fitzgerald said.

Auckland Council records shows the Hilton, at 141 Quay St, was valued at $44.6 million in July 2008.

Its top floor is the quarter-acre apartment of bankrupt property developer David Henderson, whose Kitchener Group developed all six buildings on the wharf, creating bars, restaurants, covered carparking, apartments, offices and the hotel. Henderson still lives in the apartment, despite attempts to sell it for about $10 million.

All the wharf properties are on terminating leases, set to run for another 84 years, so that after then the buildings have no legal right to occupy the wharf space.

Hilton's restaurant White has been shut for some time as it undergoes a refurbishment and is expected to have a new name when it reopens.

Humphries said the ground-floor Overseas Passenger Terminal in the building was part of the sale deal.

That made me sit up. The Overseas Passenger Terminal on Princes Wharf is apparently up for sale along with the Hilton Hotel. Makes sense I suppose. One careful owner since 2001. Lock and stock and barrel up for sale.

The history of how this all got built, and shifted from public ownership and into private control is not a happy history - especially if you believe there needs to be much more in the way of a destination focus for Auckland's 1.4 million people down there. How many councillors understand that even council's own plans for Princes Wharf redevelopment included art galleries, museums, and a cinema.

Have a look at this if you need reminding: How Sad is Princes Wharf?, and How Sad is Princes Wharf - Part II

But I digress. Back to Granny Herald's story:

Humphries said the ground-floor Overseas Passenger Terminal in the building was part of the sale deal.

"This also acts as a conference and exhibition centre for the hotel.

So. Here we have the agent acting on behalf of the owners, talking up the alternative uses of what we know as Auckland's Overseas Passenger Terminal. So. Auckland didn't get a cinema, or a museum, or much else in the way of public waterfront amenity on Princes Wharf. The cruise ship industry has turned its nose up at the facilities it has had access to and use of for close to a decade. And now it's apparently for sale. So where are they going to go? Read further on in the story...

"Auckland Council has indicated that the passenger terminal will move to Queens Wharf in the 2012-13 cruise ship season, which will therefore allow the hotel to utilise this space more efficiently during future cruise ship seasons."

Man oh man. So that's the deal. Without even a whiff of a Waterfront Masterplan, Auckland Council has indicated that the passenger terminal will move to Queens Wharf.

So. Auckland's relentless and destructive policy of privatising waterfront amenity is still alive and well under King Len and his happy Councillors. And I thought the whole reason for having a Waterfront Development Agency was to take an integrated look at Auckland's whole waterfront.

This piecemeal sale of Princes Wharf is an injury by itself, but if that sale also inevitably leads to the sale of much of Queens Wharf's amenity to the cruise ship industry, then it will be an insult to Auckland.

Fonterra's Unsustainable Thirst

The caption that ran with this Fonterra story: The dairy industry has a lot to smile about given New Zealand's advantages....



On Saturday June 18th, NZ Herald's Business pages carried a useful article with a set of indicators which explain why Fonterra's current activities in New Zealand are fundamentally unsustainable...

At our annual investor conference last week, one of the presentations was from Fonterra. Feedback from the 600 private client attendees was that this was one of the most interesting talks of the day....

The first point made by Jonathan Mason, Fonterra's chief financial officer, was that New Zealand is a great place for dairy farming, if not the best in the world. The key reason is simple. We have an abundance of water, which makes us great at growing grass and gives us a distinct cost advantage over many countries.

According to Water NZ, New Zealand receives the same amount of rainfall that lands on the entire Australian continent each year, despite Australia being 28 times our size. This ample rainfall underpins New Zealand's position as a low-cost producer of protein.

Our rainfall averages 2m a year, more than double the 0.8m world average.....

Now, while this might be true, the reality is that New Zealand ranges from being water rich to water poor. In fact using international metrics, the rainfall in Canterbury and Otago is low. Yet this is where Fonterra and its legions of farmers are attempting to establish these water hungry enterprises. Eere is what Environment Canterbury says on its website:

The Canterbury Plains themselves have relatively low rainfall and the normally fast-draining characteristics of the soils and rock mean large seasonal fluctuations in the soil moisture content.

Rainfall recharge is therefore critical to maintain groundwater levels and thus the supply of water in these drier areas during spring and summer.

Christchurch has an average annual rainfall of 648 millimetres (roughly half that of Auckland and Wellington). So. To talk of average rainfall in the vicinity of 2 metres a year is plain misleading.

And Otago is no better.

Met Service data says this about rainfall in New Zealand:

The mean annual rainfall ranges from as little as 300mm in a small area of Central Otago to over 8000mm in the Southern Alps. The average for the whole country is high, but for the greater part lies between 600 and 1500mm. The only areas with average rainfalls under 600mm are found in the South Island to the east of the main ranges, and include most of Central and North Otago, and South Canterbury.

These are the very driest parts of New Zealand. Otago and South Canterbury - but these are just the areas that are being targetted for conversion to dairy in what amounts to one of the most damaging tragedies of the commons that New Zealand has ever faced. And it is supported by Central Government.

The Herald article continues:

This level of rainfall has a huge bearing on our ability to provide pasture for grazing dairy cows and gives us a strong competitive advantage over other parts of the world that have to supplement their stock with various types of feed, which are usually grain-based. While few local dairy farmers use grain-based supplements, as much as 90 per cent of the rest of the world's dairy cows rely on this, and face its consequently higher cost structure....

Australia and some parts of South America and South Africa operate in a similar way to us, and certain areas in the United States have begun to adopt our model. However, New Zealand still offers a superior environment. We have a stable political landscape and a reputation for safe, high-quality food products in our favour, too....

You see what I mean about "Government support". 50 years ago New Zealand was wealthy because we had 70,000,000 sheep that stripped vegetation to bedrock in the high country (no more soil left, it all washed away), and Great Britain bought most of the meat while NZ benefitted from Fergusons and Vanguards and washing machines. Now it's milk fat and China buys a lot of it and we get all those plasma screens and cheap stuff to buy in the Warehouse. But does that make it alright?

A co-operative owned by 10,500 farmer shareholders, Fonterra is the world's largest exporter of milk powder, has revenue of $17 billion and operating earnings of $1 billion. It has 432 tankers across 17 depots, operates 86 plants in New Zealand and has the largest milk dryers in the world. It uses 11 New Zealand ports to send 140,000 containers each year to its millions of customers in 140 different countries.

While New Zealand only accounts for about 2 per cent of world dairy production, we export 95 per cent of this. This is in contrast with most other dairy producing nations around the world, where the vast majority is consumed domestically.

Unsurprisingly, China is a key export market, taking nearly a third of Fonterra's milk products last year.... China's growing demand for high-value agricultural products bodes well for New Zealand. The local agricultural sector, blessed as it is with high rainfall, is well placed to benefit from a China that is expected to become a major importer of food....

And so it goes, and it gets better....

In addition to the growing demand, water shortages could see China become a major food importer in future. China has only one-third of the freshwater per capita of the global average and, unfortunately, the worst water shortages often coincide with the populous northern region.... As urbanisation continues, a higher proportion of fresh water will be required for residential consumption, further limiting what is available for use in agriculture.

This good news story makes no mention of the enormous long term damage that is being done to New Zealand's waterways, rivers, and lakes. I don't know how this environmental damage stacks up alongside what happened to NZ's high country, but it is not good, and it fundamentally affects our own enjoyment of our country - let alone what's happening to fresh water ecosystems. And it is dishonest to suggest that the very areas where dairy farming is expanding have "ample water". They do not. They fall into the category of "water impoverished". And the more water that is sucked out of the ground in these parts of New Zealand to force-irrigate grass, the quicker we will kill the country's rivers.

It can't last, and it needs to change.

But in the meantime, Fonterra's bosses will make hay...

Any land-based venture is not without risk and cyclical ups and downs are to be expected. It should also be noted it does not provide specific exposure to dairy farms or the commodity milk price - rather, it is a manufacturer and marketing company of dairy products. However, the long-term growth potential for Fonterra is enormous.

Councils Fudge Christchurch Seismicity

There has been huge interest in the research I reported in my blog posting entitled Faulty Thinking About Christchurch. This research showed that work had been done in the late 1980's and early 1990's in New Zealand - by the Earthquake Commission and by the NZ Institute of Geological and Nuclear Science - about the risk of an earthquake event in Christchurch.

In particular this research warned that:

every 20 years, an earthquake of Modified Mercalli scale VII can be expected in Christchurch (slight damage in well-constructed buildings; slight to moderate in well-built ordinary structures; much damage in poorly constructed buildings; chimneys broken)

and every 55 years an earthquake of Modified Mercalli scale VIII can be expected (Damage is still only slight in structures built to be earthquake-resistant; among substantial ordinary buildings there is much damage and some collapse. Poorly built buildings are substantially damaged. Tall things such as chimneys and monuments collapse. Heavy furniture is overturned).

The purpose of this posting is to report what I have learned about the response of Christchurch Regional Council (Environment Canterbury) and of Christchurch City Council to these warnings, and how they have fulfilled their duties under the Resource Management Act (RMA).

Indications are that the Christchurch seismic risk has been systematically minimised by both Environment Canterbury and Chriscthurch City Council.

Section 30(1)(c) of the RMA states:

"Every Regional Council shall have the following functions for the purpose of giving effect to this Act in its region... the control of the use of land for the purpose of.... the avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards...."

In Environment Canterbury's (ECan) website we read under a heading: "Earthquake Hazard and Risk Assessment Study" that:

Environment Canterbury needs to know the likely impact and consequences of a major earthquake on Christchurch, to fulfil its hazard mitigation and emergency management functions. Environment Canterbury considers that the earthquake hazard information currently available is generally of a standard and scale suitable for an earthquake risk assessment.

This webpage goes on to describe work that was done for ECan by OPUS Consultants in 2005.

In the Executive Summary of that OPUS report we read:

A methodology has been developed to undertake an earthquake risk assessment for Christchurch. The approach has been based on generating risk information that meets the objectives of Environment Canterbury and provides a basis for organisations to undertake risk management actions.... An assessment of the risk from earthquakes to Christchurch will assist with the management of the risk, through reduction, readiness, response and recovery planning.

Toward the end of the substantial report there are more than 20 recommendations, among which are these:

Environment Canterbury will be commissioning an earthquake risk assessment study for Christchurch. The objectives of such a risk assessment are to understand the likely impact and consequences of a major earthquake on Christchurch, to fulfil its hazard mitigation and emergency management functions, and provide information to stakeholders for them to fulfil their responsibilities under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act. The following recommendations are made:

(i) A risk assessment study be carried out as envisaged to provide information for risk management planning and implementation by Environment Canterbury, and other stakeholders.

vii) Three earthquake scenarios and a possible fourth scenario be used for the risk
assessment, to provide earthquake risk information to enable emergency response
planning for a range of scenarios. The fourth scenario of a hidden Canterbury
Plains Fault earthquake should be discussed with seismologists as part of the risk
assessment, to decide on the appropriateness for this study.

(ix) The liquefaction ground damage map for the Alpine Fault compiled for ECan be
extended to present liquefaction ground damage for earthquake scenarios.

xv) Casualties be assessed based on day time and night time population distributions, based primarily on building damage.

xxiii) The study be carried out based on a robust understanding of the performance of buildings and lifelines in earthquakes and the earthquake hazards affecting
Christchurch.

As far as I can tell, none of these recommendations have been followed up. I repeat the sentence that is set out in ECan's website: "Environment Canterbury considers that the earthquake hazard information currently available is generally of a standard and scale suitable for an earthquake risk assessment." I read that as: don't call us, we'll call you.... But before I move on from that 2005 Opus report, I note some of the information and comments made in the body of the text about the risk of earthquake in Christchurch - based on a literature search:

Beca Carter Hollings & Ferner (2004) report on the outcomes of the Christchurch Liquefaction Study for Environment Canterbury. Liquefaction maps are provided for two groundwater levels, and indicate high, moderate or low liquefaction potential, depending on whether liquefaction is likely in 0.12g, 0.2g or 0.34g earthquake shaking levels. (Ed: Anyone seen these maps?)

The Earthquake Hazard in Christchurch (Elder et al, 1991) presented a detailed evaluation of the earthquake hazards in Christchurch, and contributed to a significant advance in the knowledge of the earthquake hazards in the city. It considered earthquake fault sources, a prediction of the intensity of ground shaking (with associated probabilities and recurrence intervals) ... It also presented some generic comments on the potential damage to buildings and infrastructure. However, this did not provide a formal assessment of the risk....

Risks & Realities, a report of the Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Group (Centre for Advanced Engineering, 1997) presents a multi-disciplinary approach... It discusses three potential sources of earthquakes:
1. Moderately large to large earthquake in the Canterbury Foothills or North Canterbury
2. A very large earthquake on the Alpine Fault
3. Earthquakes centred close to Christchurch

The first two scenarios were considered to be capable of causing MM VIII to IX shaking intensities on the Modified Mercalli Scale, and the third MM VIII intensity.

The lifeline study adopted a 150-year return period earthquake with shaking intensities of MM VIII – IX over most of Christchurch. There was disagreement between researchers as to the expected intensity of shaking in a 150-year return period earthquake....

And then the report gets buried in a morass of conflicting data about ground accelerations and spectral accelerations, and confusion between the effects of local and alpine fault originated earthquakes, but continues to assert "there remains the potential for “hidden” earthquake sources...". The Opus report does not appear to question the earthquake predictions of Elder, but there is much talk in the report of 475 year return period earthquakes and 1000 year return period earthquakes....

In fact, the clarity of the original Elder work done for EQC in 1991, which was based on 150 years of known earthquake history, gets lost in all this confusion. However the report does state: "Information of the North Canterbury fault and fold belt is noted to be limited..."

And that was that for the 2005 Opus report. It was as if oil had been poured on troubled water. Nothing else appears to have happened. Almost a case of "we don't really want to know what the seismic risk is here - otherwise we might have to do something about it...."

There are other interesting pieces of information on the ECan website. For example there is the 2008 Q-Files Earthquake Booklet, and there is an information packed sheet entitled: Solid Facts About Christchurch Liquefaction. While these are interesting, I don't consider that by themselves they fully discharge ECan's duties under the RMA.

I checked this by investigating ECan's Regional Policy Statement (RPS) which is where you would expect to find any policies that ECan has in respect of natural hazards and in particular - earthquakes. These are very long and challenging documents at the best of times, so I have been selective. Chapter 16 is about Natural Hazards. It begins with some promise:

Chapter 16 Natural Hazards.

Natural hazards in Canterbury can be ranked by the potential damage that could result, for example, taken on an annual basis. Limited information suggests that the most severe regionally significant natural hazards in the region are, in order of importance:
(1) Large magnitude earthquake affecting Christchurch.
(2) Extreme drought.
(3) Waimakariri River flooding of Christchurch and Kaiapoi.
(4) Major tsunami affecting southern Pegasus Bay and Banks Peninsula, or Timaru coastline.

Other natural occurrences of importance include flooding, fire, wind, snowfall, landslip, erosion and sedimentation (including dune build-up), but the relative impact of these, and what degree of management, if any, is warranted, has yet to be determined.

Sounds like a call for a risk assessment. But wait. There's more to be fair. Regional Policy Statements are required by the RMA to contain: objectives, policies and methods. So here's Objective 1:

ECan RPS Chapter 16 Objective 1
Avoid or mitigate the actual or potential costs of loss or damage to life, property, or other parts of the environment from natural hazards.

Principal Reasons
Natural hazards can result in loss or damage to people, property, or the environment. The aim of natural hazard management is to minimise the net cost of such damage.

Policy 1
In managing natural hazards, highest priority should be given to the combination of measures which delivers the greatest net benefit.

Explanation
Priority treatment of natural hazards is a policy of dealing first with those that offer the highest return on available investment. This is expressed in terms of protection gained and costs incurred, a notion embodied in the term used above - greatest net benefit. In the calculation of benefit, and of costs, both monetary and non-monetary values are included. Nonmonetary factors include effects on people, cultural values, ecosystems, landscape, and amenity. These values are taken into account by comparing alternative options. Although it is not possible to place a precise dollar value on any improvement in non-monetary benefit, methods are available for gauging whether or not the additional non-monetary benefit exceeds any added monetary cost.

Net benefit, then, is the sum of net monetary benefit, and net non-monetary benefit.

A natural hazard is the interaction or potential interaction between a natural occurrence and something of value to people (ie, assets).... Consistent with this, one natural occurrence may give rise to several natural hazards. A single flood for example, may affect some homes and their occupants, some farmland, a major bridge and an airfield. Each of these interactions is a separate natural hazard. Likewise a single earthquake may affect a main highway and a town.....

For the purposes of this policy, it is these six distinct natural hazards (interactions between a natural occurrence and people and their homes, farmland, a major bridge, airfield, highway and town), not the two hazard triggers (flood and earthquake), that are to be prioritised....

Principal Reasons
Resources for dealing with natural hazards are limited, and it is important to put that investment first in the places where it is likely to do most good.

Methods
1. The methods used or to be used by the Regional Council are:
(b) Regional plans
(d) Information provision
(f) Advocacy, promotion and co-operation

2. District/city councils in the preparation, variation, change, or review of district plans, through the exercise of their functions should, where their responsibilities for natural hazards are stated in this Regional Policy Statement, consider including provisions that:
(a) give highest priority to managing those natural hazards where the greatest net benefit can be delivered.

So. The guts of this appears to be that for this policy, earthquakes are not prioritised, but their effects are. (Presumably that would be why a risk assessment was thought to be needed at one time...) And that maybe Christchurch City Council has responsibility - but only if ECan's RPS states they have responsibility.

My take on what happened is this: Figures of around $1 billion crop up in ECan thinking as the predicted cost of damage to Christchurch of an earthquake (compare with the actual estimated cost to date of earthquake damage of $20 billion). Combine this with preliminary Opus earthquake return predictions of every 475 years or every 900 years, and you can see that ECan's "cost-benefit" calculations would under-estimate the danger of the Christchurch seismic situation by a factor of 100 at least.

Clearly we need to plough on into the ECan RPS. To the next policy. To Policy 2:

ECan RPS Chapter 16 Policy 2
For the Canterbury region, or any part of the region, which local authority shall have responsibility within its own area for developing objectives, policies, and rules relating to the control of the use of land for the avoidance or mitigation of
natural hazards shall be determined in the following manner:
(a) Particular responsibility for any particular hazard or group of hazards shall initially remain with the local authority or local authorities managing that hazard or group of hazards as at 1 January 1994. Where this responsibility is not clear, the Regional Council shall retain primary responsibility....

Explanation
Natural occurrences that have a potential for adverse effects on people, property, and the environment come in many forms, among them earthquake, tsunami, erosion, landslip, wind, fire, drought, and flooding. Unless the Regional Policy Statement states which local authority or combination of local authorities is responsible for particular natural hazards, the Regional Council retains primary responsibility. Under this policy, the particular responsibility being undertaken initially remains with the local authority or local authorities managing the particular natural hazard at the time the policy was prepared. Subsequent to the Regional
Policy Statement becoming operative, the Regional Council will consult with territorial authorities in the region on any need for a re-allocation of natural hazard responsibilities, and may as a result prepare a change to the Regional Policy Statement.

“Managing” in the context of this policy includes taking particular responsibility for a particular hazard or group of hazards.

It should be noted that under the Building Act 1991, a building consent must be issued by a territorial authority, and that under the RM Act control of the subdivision of land is a function of territorial authorities.

Principal Reasons
To make clear for any particular natural hazard in Canterbury, how it is to be decided which should be dealt with by the Regional Council, and which by city and district councils.

Methods
1. The methods used or to be used by the Regional Council are:
(a) Responsibility for managing natural hazards
(g) Use of other legislation

This is a remarkably convoluted policy. It appears to say that ECan has responsibility, unless its RPS states that Christchurch City Council has responsibility. But it's about as clear as mud to me whether ECan or Christchurch City Council shoulders RMA responsibility for earthquakes in Christchurch City. And then we get to Policy 3.

ECan RPS Chapter 16 Policy 3
Where there is no provision for natural hazard in a plan relevant to an area in which an application for a resource consent has been received, the consent authority should, when having regard to this Regional Policy Statement, take a precautionary approach to the potential for a natural hazard to be created or increased as it relates to the applicant or any other person or property. This may be achieved by giving priority to the principle of avoidance.

Explanation
Many natural hazards have yet to be dealt with in plans or strategies, and many others are of such a localised or minor nature that they are never likely to be. The Regional Council and territorial authorities in the region, when considering applications for resource consents must, among other things, consider the possible natural hazard effects of granting such applications. This policy gives priority in those situations to keeping assets away from sources of danger.

Ok so this is about precaution. If no hazard management plans or strategies exist "...keep assets away from sources of danger...". This presumes knowledge of the sources of danger.

Which brings me to Christchurch City Council's District Plan (CCCDP). Man oh man. You're doing well to get this far.

In the Issues for Christchurch section of the CCCDP, Section 3.4, Natural Hazards, we read:

CCCDP 3.4 Natural hazards
Within Christchurch there is risk from a number of natural hazards including:
• possible sea level rises;
• erosion of the coastline and rivers;
• erosion of the Port Hills;
• flooding from the rivers and the coast;
• damage caused by high winds;
• earthquakes; and
• fires in rural areas....

Both the Canterbury Regional Council and Council have responsibilities under the Act for control of the use of land for the avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards. The Regional Council has considerable knowledge about river and coastal processes that give rise to the major natural hazards. The Act requires the Council to hold records of areas subject to natural hazards and has considerable expertise in earthquake standards, flooding and erosion control measures....

Nothing particularly unexpected there. But the collective ECan and CCC is worrying. Continues the concern that here is an issue that is falling between two Council stools.

CCCDP 3.4.5 Earthquake risk

Christchurch lies on the edge of a seismically active region. Consequently, earthquakes are likely to occur at a magnitude which will have major impacts on the City. In addition, there are other areas of active faults close to Christchurch, including Pegasus Bay, Porters Pass, Ashley and Mt Grey, Hope and Lake Heron.

The two main hazards which result from earthquakes are earth deformation (ground surface rupture) and earth shaking (liquefaction, land sliding, ground-cracking, tsunamis).

Strong shaking associated with either a close small magnitude earthquake, or a large magnitude distant event could cause considerable damage to the City, in particular in urban areas.

While single or two storey timber-framed residential dwellings are unlikely to suffer much structural damage in these events, in some areas liquefaction (where the solid ground takes on liquid qualities due to increased pressures) could cause distortion of buildings. Damage to buried cables, water and sewage pipes could also occur.

The most susceptible areas to liquefaction are those with water saturated, loose, well soiled silt and sand. It is also common in peaty soils. Large parts of the eastern suburbs and area around the Heathcote River are underlaid by these materials....

That all rings fairly true. So what are the objectives, policies and methods for dealing with this issue? Well here they are:

CCCDP 2.5 Objective : Natural hazards

To avoid or mitigate the actual or potential adverse effects of loss or damage to life, property, or other parts of the environment from natural hazards.

Reasons
There are a number of potential natural hazards which can affect land within the City. These hazards include the following:
• Flooding from the Waimakariri River, or the river systems within the City, particularly the Heathcote.... etc etc and;
• Seismic activity and liquefaction; etc...

2.5.1 Policy : Presence of natural hazards

To control development within the City to protect life and investment, taking account of the presence of natural hazards and the degree of risk that those hazards impose on the environment.

Explanation and reasons

Natural hazards occur in varying degrees, and may cover greatly different areas.....It is not practicable, either through regulation or other means, to provide total security and protection from natural hazards. The protection of life and investment from natural hazards needs to take into account the likely risks as a result of natural hazards that may affect them. In undertaking measures which may involve intervention in the development or subdivision of land, the Council needs to provide a balance between economic and community needs and any proposals for land use controls, particularly where lower risk and the severity of likely impacts to property is apparent, and mitigation measures are effective and environmentally sound....

2.5.3 Policy : Earthquake

To ensure that buildings are constructed in a manner (or where appropriate, reconstructed) to ensure that their stability in times of earthquake is sufficient to avoid, or at least minimise, loss of life or damage to property.

Explanation and reasons

Christchurch is subject to a reasonably high level of risk from seismic activity and there are limitations to the degree of protection that can be provided from this hazard. However, there are provisions under the Building Act which ensure that new buildings are constructed to a standard which ensures that they have adequate resistance to seismic events. Where appropriate, existing buildings can be upgraded to provide a higher degree of protection. This latter matter has to be balanced however, after taking account of the Council's life safety obligations detailed in the Building Act, with recognition that some buildings would have to be demolished if protection to full earthquake standards were required, as the cost of upgrading would be uneconomic. The Council will in these circumstances take into account the potential land use activities and the risks to life within buildings of this nature, as well as the heritage values of buildings where this is appropriate.

Implementation

Objective 2.5 and associated policies will be implemented through a number of methods including the following...:
• Pattern of zoning that limits development of hazardous areas, e.g. South New Brighton Coastal Hazard Area;
• City rules for Subdivision and Development, including esplanade reserves or strips, and rules for natural and other hazards;

Other methods....:
• Provision of information, e.g. maintenance of information on the extent and location of hazards, (Council's Hazards Register).
• The provisions of the Building Act 2004, such as conditions on building resistance to seismic events.

These words are all good, but little happens on the ground with these sorts of methods unless they are strongly enforced, monitored, and compliance measured. By contrast the methods adopted for flooding (rain - not liquefaction flooding) are extensive. The driver for the difference appears to be that earthquakes "hardly ever happen" (no surprise when you change the return period from 20 years to 475 years), while floods are frequent. Crude cost-benefit calculations complete the policy damage.

Generally, as far as I could find, there are no liquefaction maps anywhere - though there now does appear to be some liquefaction reference on property LIM files. I am uncertain when that was implemented. This is private information. Does taht system constitute a "hazard register"?

You can search the CCCDP. I looked for liquefaction. It's only in the references I have already given above. You won't find it anywhere else. But it used to be scattered throughout the District Plan.

As you will see in the final case study (below) I wonder whether the Council paid any heed to its own plan, weakened as it is by a shakey earthquake risk assessment.

In my research I came across CCCDP Plan Change 28. This relates to a large chunk of land at Ferrymead.

This is the Plan Change map. And here's how the land is described: "A large tract of land between Heathcote Village and the Heathcote River remains relatively undeveloped, despite in some cases having been previously zoned for intensive activities. Containing approximately 194 hectares, it is bounded by the Lyttelton railway line, Tunnel Road, Heathcote River, Bridle Path Road and Heathcote Village and incorporates the Ferrymead Historic Park. The Historic Park apart, the majority of the land is used for grazing and horse training purposes. However, it also includes important wetland and reserve areas along the banks of the Heathcote River...."

This Google Earth picture shows the land, and you can see where the land to be re-zoned lies. That its boundary is largely formed by the Heathcote River. The Plan Change was to allow the land to be rezoned for commercial/industrial purposes.

In this map you can see the area of land to be re-zoned, and how it was treated by Government "red", "orange", "green" zones. In fact it is in a "white" zone. hasn't yet been labelled.

It was labelled in the NZGNIS work of 1995 though, and you can see that here. In fact it is on land that is at "moderate risk" of liquefaction. Interestenigly, the 2005 Opus report makes specific reference to this land in the following terms: "Soils & Foundations (1999b) also assessed the potential for liquefaction in the Ferrymead Special Planning Zone along the Heathcote River, and concluded that of the 11 sites investigated, 5 had a medium to high probability of liquefaction and lateral spreading in a moderate earthquake (450 year return period) and an additional 3 sites had a similar probability of liquefaction in a large earthquake (1000 year return period)." (I suggest that these return periods be taken with a grain of salt for reasons already given.)

This is a section of the plan change documentation. You can read it better if you click it. You will see it talks about the need for a setback of buildings from the Heathcote River. The old plan noted a reason for a 50 metre setback was to: "minimise the risk of damage to buildings and infrastructure from liquefaction." But that objective was deleted in the plan change. It's gone from the public record.

I wonder what other changes have been made to Christchurch City Planning documents to remove references to the inconvenient truth that it has always been an earthquake prone city, ignoring the "build to the conditions" message that has been consistently delivered by consultants for the past two decades.

Parnell Station = Ad Hoc Planning

I understand pressure is being exerted on Auckland Transport to build a railway station at Parnell in the near future. I am not sure of the proposed location along that 1 km long section of straight railway (shown in the aerial here) which runs up a steady incline. However I am advised that building a station will require substantial civil works along the whole line to provide a flat section of line for the station itself. And while there is a small walkup catchment for a station at Parnell, I consider that this station is not a priority for Auckland now, and building it now may preclude options which will become evident when longer term planning for Auckland's commuter rail networks is undertaken and agreed.

For example, this schematic shows the pedestrian walkup zones around several key CBD destinations - including the learning quarter (Auckland University and AUT), and the Hospital. Present plans for the CBD Rail Loop project (from Britomart, Aotea Square, K Road, Newton, Mt Eden), cannot serve all key Auckland destinations. Choices have been made. However other decisions will also need to be made.

For example, the CBD Rail Loop is likely to be the first stage of the development of Auckland's CBD rail network. The proposed North Shore Rail line needs to be brought into the CBD and properly interconnected with the rest of the network. There has been a lot of talk about these rail projects, but detailed thinking and network planning has not been evident. This is not the time to be rushing ahead with a railway station project at Parnell. Auckland has much bigger fish to fry, and critical transport and land use planning processes must be allowed to unfold - in coordination with the Spatial Plan. This schematic which I produced a couple of years ago shows one scenario for longer term CBD Rail network planning. The line from North Shore would connect at the Aotea Station which would be an interchange between two lines. We need to move beyond producing spur lines, and instead produce loops and end-to-end lines (that's why the Northern Busway needs to run through the Auckland CBD and serve Southern destinations). The more passenger transport vehicles that DON'T terminate in the CBD, the better. These are rough ideas only, but they are rough ideas which aim to join up the thinking between the various projects that are being discussed. Auckland needs more of this type of Rapid Transit network planning. It needs to be focussed on delivery and staged implementation. It must not be de-railed by ad hoc decisions.

Christchurch Earthquake Newspaper Archive

Here a few newspaper stories from the Christchurch earthquake archives that I have scanned for your interest. If you click the images you can see them enlarged at a good resolution.... The Wellington Independent, Volume XXIV, Issue 2847, 10 June 1869, Page 6, carried this story about the 1869 earthquake in Canterbury which severely affected Christchurch. NB: this was before the Cathedral was built.

SERIOUS EARTHQUAKE CHRISTCHURCH CATHEDRAL SPIRE KNOCKED DOWN. Runs the headline in this story run in the Evening Post, Volume XXXVI, Issue 54, 1 September 1888, Page 2. The news stories go for some time as to how the spire was repaired. It was a tall order.... Apparently some of the stonework ended up in Colombo Street.

HEAVILY SHAKEN, runs the headline in this Evening Post story, Volume CIV, Issue 152, 26 December 1922, Page 8. Not as strong as some of the previous ones. Certainly not as damaging as the Cheviot earthquake in 1901 described in my "Faulty thinking..." posting below.

...here that news story continues. It's worth a read. Maybe it tells us all we need to know about why these previous earthquakes have been ignored - certainly by the media anyway. It's almost treated as a joke. It's always someone else - or someone else's chimney, or church spire, that falls down. Maybe it's better to laugh and joke about something you can't control. Sort of larikan kiwi laughing on the terraces while Christchurch crumbles. Where does the memory of a city reside? Archives (where no-one goes)? Council (which sits on inconvenient truths)? Media (which does not want to be blamed for negativity - bad news stories turn off the investment tap)? Maybe that's why we have the EQC - because earthquakes happen.