This post contains an essay submitted as part of student course work for the Planning 100 "Introduction to Planning" course taught by me this year at Planning School, University of Auckland. The topic for the essay is: Argue a case, either for, or against, the value of using utopianism as a method in planning the future of a modern city of your choice. The essay is by Ties Coomber, who has kindly given permission for it to be published here.
The inevitability and value of utopianism in planning.
Whether utopianism is a valuable method to use when planning the future of a modern city depends on two considerations: 1) how utopianism is defined, and 2) how the resulting conception of utopianism is applied. The definition outlined in this essay will show that any human planning activity constitutes utopianism. Though utopianism may be inevitable in planning, it faces crucial problems. I will explore, then, how utopianism might be applied in the face of these problems to make the most of its inevitability, thereby increasing its value in the planning process.
Defining utopianism
Distinguishing between ‘utopianism’ and a ‘utopia’ is the first important step in defining exactly what this essay is addressing. Though the etymology of ‘utopia’ suggests it refers to any imaginary place, ‘utopia’ has come to mean only an ideal imaginary place (Carey 1999). To contrast its now common meaning, imaginary places worthy of our fear have been coined ‘dystopias’ (Carey 1999). Typically, utopias have been expressed in works of fiction as a means of critiquing a society with which the author is disillusioned. Famous examples, such as George Orwell’s (1949) ‘1984’, play with the fine line between a utopia and a dystopia. These kinds of examples appear to warn people that the society in which we live may be headed in a frightening direction; and that though it may be someone’s utopia, such a society is certainly someone’s (perhaps many people’s) dystopia. In any case, a utopia in this sense is a description of some non-existent, perfect (in the eye of the beholder) place. Utopias might also refer to specific examples in which a person or group has brought into existence their ideal, imaginary place. Examples include Robert Owen’s ‘New Harmony’ and Charles Fourier’s Phalanx (Tod & Wheeler 1978). These certainly raise the question of whether such places constitute utopias, as they are no longer imaginary. This question is answered easily (with a ‘no’) if the definition of ‘utopia’ we adopt specifies that the place must be imaginary. Such a definition, however, leads to an unintuitive result, because these examples of existing ‘utopias’ certainly appear to deserve the name.
It seems, then, that the definition of utopia would benefit from encompassing existing as well as imaginary places. It must, however, distinguish between existing places that are utopias and existing places that are not utopias. I propose that a society, whether it exists or not, is a utopia to some person if it maps exactly on to that person’s ideal imagined society. This definition has three important consequences: 1) Whether or not a place is a utopia is relative to a person’s ideals – utopias are subjective, 2) someone’s ideal imaginary place retains its title as a utopia after they bring it into existence (supposing their ideals remain the same), and 3) someone’s utopia can change as their ideals change. In fact, as individuals develop throughout their lives, their ideals will almost certainly change, bringing with them changes in what would constitute for them a utopia. Utopias are subjective, ideal, almost certainly changing places.
What, then, is ‘utopianism’? If a utopia is the ideal, then utopianism is the method by which one attempts to match the existing with the ideal. It seems, then, that adjusting one’s ideal imagined society (what is going on in your head) to match your current existing society (what is going on in reality) constitutes utopianism. This is an interesting thought, but will not be developed here. This essay addresses the value of utopianism as a method in planning, so the focus will be on influencing the existing to match the ideal.
Because people’s ideals are subjective and shifting through time, pinning down the exact goal (the utopia) of a particular instance of utopianism is problematic. What is clear, however, is the notion that the existing society could be better. Any change, then, that attempts to better the existing society counts as utopianism, as these changes are motivated by ideal-driven goals, subjective and shifting though they are. Not only do any changes with the intention of bettering society constitute utopianism, but planning for a static or even a worse society might also constitute utopianism. For example, it is hard to imagine how to plan a mutually ideal society for two people whose respective ideals are irreconcilable. Some might argue that these sorts of problems justify avoiding utopianism altogether. This position, however, is motivated by the belief that avoiding the problems associated with utopianism is better than the good that might come of applying utopianism. Deciding that it is best to keep things the way they are to avoid dealing with conflicting ideals begins to sound like some form of utopianism itself; the ideal or goal being to live in a society that avoids this kind of conflict by remaining static. Further, a planner might wish to make a city worse for the sake of avoiding or spiting utopianism. Such a planner, however, would be motivated by the belief that a city which avoids and spites utopianism is ideal, i.e. some sort of utopia itself. It seems, then, that as planners we are engaging inevitably in some form of utopianism. Whether or not we achieve the ideal goal itself, we are influencing the existing society at least in the direction of some ideal.
Applying utopianism
As argued above, utopianism is the method through which one strives to match their existing society with their ideal society. Because every decision we make with respect to the future of our society is based on some ideal outcome, any planning decision seems to constitute utopianism. The subjectivity and relativity of utopias and ideals, however, poses problems for making planning decisions. Because one person’s ideals might change over time, and ideals differ between people, it seems that utopianism has a shifting target for one person; a vague common target for a group of people whose ideals are somewhat similar; and no common target for a group of people whose ideals are incongruent. Further, some people may have only a vague, undetailed idea of their utopia. So, for them, applying utopianism might be like climbing a mountain whose top you cannot see. Subjectivity and relativity seem to render utopianism near impracticable to apply. We could attempt to judge which utopia is most worthy as a goal, but the standards by which we would make that judgment are also likely subjective. Further, if someone imposes their utopia on other citizens, it has the potential to disgruntle and frighten many of them; and a society full of disgruntled, scared people is surely (unless the planner has very unusual ideals) no longer a utopia. How can we best address these problems and maximise the value of utopianism?
Perhaps the subjectivity of ideals is problematic only when the utopias are thought of as detailed goals. Levitas (2000) argues that once we acknowledge that utopias are based on relative moral and ethical values that are influenced by one’s current situation, utopias have to shift from systematic, detailed representations to general, exploratory depictions. These act simply as a catalyst for change toward a general direction rather than a specific goal. Harré (2011) adds to this by suggesting that utopias catalyze change by inspiring creativity. She argues that positive emotions tend to elicit broader thinking about how to contribute to the betterment of society. She supports this claim by providing evidence that reading a description of an ‘Ecotopia’ (a utopia centered on ideals of ecology and sustainability) inspires more hope, intrigue and creativity than does reading a passage that employs scare tactics to motivate change. We may disagree over whether specific elements of a utopia are important or even possible. Nonetheless, as a general catalyst for change or as a means of inspiring creativity, publicly displaying and discussing utopias may be an important way to add value to the method of utopianism.
Another way to add value to the method of utopianism is by reinforcing Levitas’ (2000) idea that ideals are heavily influenced by one’s current situation. By using utopias as general depictions of a desirable direction, the details of which are intended only to inspire creativity and intrigue, progress might be catalyzed such that the resulting changes in circumstances (physical or emotional) bring about common changes in ideals. For example, the Australian green bans movement (a utopian project in the 1970s) consisted of a group of construction workers who boycotted projects that they deemed ecologically or socially harmful (Burgmann & Milner 2011). Note that this instance of utopianism is not painting a detailed picture of a utopia as a goal. Rather, the people involved agreed that they could make an improvement on their situation and headed in a general better direction. Perhaps most interesting, though, are the social impacts of this movement. The ever-mounting support eventually overturned the power relations at the time, and the environment has subsequently benefited from being open to influence from the public (Burgmann & Milner 2011). It seems that once the utopianism ball is rolling, people get mobile and vocal, and common ideals are realised. This is almost certainly valuable. The final point worth touching on here is concerned with the relationship between urban planning and political philosophy. Hippodamus of Miletus, considered as the father of urban planning and political philosophy, called for an integration of the two disciplines (Padden 2001). He emphasised that political relationships ought to be reflected in the layout of cities, and that the construction of an ideal political city involves applying utopian thinking to the integrated study of political philosophy and urban planning (Padden 2001). This has important implications for the value of utopianism as a method in planning, because it reminds us that our ideals form an interrelationship with the social and physical environment. ‘Bettering’ the urban environment of a city without giving thought to how it reflects and shapes the society and its citizens’ ideals is less valuable than making progress based on an integration of these considerations.
Conclusion
When utopianism is defined as the method through which an existing city is brought closer to an ideal city, it becomes clear that any plan for the future of a city constitutes utopianism. Even though utopianism is inevitable in planning, how it is applied faces problems associated with the relativity and subjectivity of ideals. Utopianism’s value in the planning process would benefit from treating utopias as general guidelines that catalyze change and inspire creativity, rather than rigid plans to be imposed on people. Further, we must keep in mind that the social environment, physical environment and people’s ideals form an interrelationship. They each reflect and are shaped by one another. Recognising this reveals utopianism as a dynamic process with an ever-changing target, the value of which is derived from openness to change, rather than the imposition of some supposedly perfect place.
References
Burgmann, V. & Milner, A. (2011). Ecotopians in hardhats: The Australian green bans movement. Utopian Studies, 22(1), 125-142.
Carey, J. (1999). Introduction. In J. Carey (Ed.), The F aber Book of Utopias (pp. xixxvi). London: Faber.
Harré, N. (2011). Psychology for a Better World: Strategies to Inspire Sustainability. Auckland, New Zealand: University of Auckland – Department of Psychology.
Levitas, R. (2000). For Utopia: The (limits of the) Utopian function in late capitalist society. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 3(2- 3), 25-43.
Orwell, G. (1949). 1984. London: Secker & Warburg.
Padden, R. (2001). The two professions of Hippodamus of Miletus. Philosophy & Geography, 4(1), 25-48.
Tod, I. & Wheeler, M. (1978). Harmony: Utopia in the New World. In I. Tod & M. Wheeler (Eds.), Utopia (pp. 81-98). London: Orbis.
No comments:
Post a Comment