Dirty Politics in Downtown Auckland

There has been a lot of interest in this posting I did about the non-notified Westfield resource consent for a 41 storey tower at the corner of Custom Street and Lower Albert Street obtained in 2008, and which Precinct Properties now owns along with its other property holdings at the site. You can read NZ Herald on the proposed building - and view a picture which is from the original 2008 application - here.

That 2008 permit would have lapsed in April 2013. But it didn't.

The Extension Process

What this posting is about is the process undertaken by Auckland Council and Westfield in 2011 to change the conditions of consent in the original permit, by inserting an extension to the tower permit out to 29th April 2018.

The chronology for this process is:

• 3rd August 2011, application to modify Westfield Tower resource consent conditions lodged
• 22nd August 2011, resolution grants the application to extend the consent out to 29 April 2018

Pretty quick. How many other consent applications get processed in this sort of timeframe?
But then, it wasn't notified, so there were no objections to deal with. Easy peasy.

The application for the extension begins with this reference to the relevant section of the RMA:

You can read there the tests that need to be passed for granting an extension.

The application argues that Westfield has done some detailed design work since consent was granted, and has approached the market to assess interest in the proposed commercial/office space. However, because of the GFC, Westfield argues, many construction projects were put on hold, and there was accordingly not enough time to get the leasing deals done, and the building built by April 2013. It also argued:

Apart from the spelling error this looks pretty tentative: "...have been actively negotiating...", "...termination clauses in most current leases...". And this is three and a half years after the consent was granted in 2008.

So what about the matter of approval. Apart from other building owners in the area, across Custom Street, and suchlike, there is the matter of the Britomart Rail tunnel proposal. This is very interesting....

Look at the words starting para 2: "Westfield was unaware of the tunnel proposition when the decision was taken to invest in the proposed scheme, and seek consent for the redevelopment of the site."

The Original Application

When I read these words, I decided to look back at the original resource consent application (April 2008). In the Auckland City Council planner's report about the application we find this para in a section discussing whether ARTA should be notified (or not) about the Westfields application to build the tower:

And there is this text in the planning officer report:

So we see here, in the original 2008 application planning report, that not only had the CEO of ARTA been advising Auckland City Council about the Britomart tunnel, but that ARTA had referred to "a dialogue it has established with the applicant (Westfield)", and that there had been media coverage about the tunnel project.

So how true is the statement: "Westfield was unaware of the tunnel proposition when the decision was taken to invest in the proposed scheme, and seek consent for the redevelopment of the site."....?

Interestingly, a chronology of events provided by the applicant in support of the extension, says this:

 Clearly ARTA was concerned that it was not officially notified about Westfield's original resource consent application, and that Auckland City Council must have supported the decision NOT to notify ARTA. What this all meant of course, that Westfield could obtain a resource consent for a 41 storey tower, without notification, and without taking into account the possibility of the rail tunnel.

It could thus claim to be first. First up, best dressed.

Concluding Assessment - Dirty Politics

Basically Westfield got its shit together in cahoots with Auckland City Council to ram through a 41 storey resource consent application, but was thrown off track by the GFC, and couldn't keep its shit together in time (5 years) to build it. In the meantime Auckland did get its shit together, the Supercity was formed along with Auckland Transport, which is a requiring authority by the way, and it has applied for the tunnel designation. I'd say to Westfield: tough. You win some, you lose some.

Question: does the timing of the extension application predate the Britomart Tunnel designation application?

And then we get to the final part of the test that needs to be satisfied:

This application to extend the permit was being considered in August 2011. Auckland Council would have been in existence for almost a year. I wonder how much was out there in the public domain about the Auckland Plan, about the rail plan, about the Britomart Rail tunnel project?

You'd have to say, if you were being a fair and reasonable person, that there were a lot of good reasons for NOT granting this extension.The commissioner decision to grant the extension is less than a page long. Man!

To finish this post I'll remind you why consent was needed in the first place in 2008. And this is according to Westfield's original application:

You can see the extent of effects - even without considering the Britomart Rail tunnel, and without considering the traffic impacts on bus movements in Lower Albert - let alone when a bus interchange is located there.

Sure "life goes on" and we can't always wait for good planning, but in my view this whole thing stinks from a consenting point of view. Lack of public notification gives an added stench.

Talk about dirty politics.

Is Quay Street REOI Too Limited?

It's good for Auckland that Deputy Mayor Penny Hulse and Council's Development Committee have taken some control over what's happening in Downtown Auckland and on the CBD Waterfront. They've called for Expressions of Interest from Urban Planners and Designers about Quay Street - not forgetting about the various other projects that interconnect.

Not everyone is delighted about this.

For example we read in stuff.co.nz: "BOULEVARD BLUES: Councillor Cameron Brewer is not convinced the plan to make Quay St a pedestrian-friendly boulevard is a good one...."

Council's media release advises:

Auckland Council is seeking proposals from designers to assist with the future redevelopment of Quay Street. Quay Street has been earmarked for change under the City Centre Master Plan – a blueprint for the future use of the central city.The council is issuing a request for expressions of interest from design consultants.Concept designs for development of Quay Street will be considered by the Auckland Development Committee, and Aucklanders will have an opportunity to have their say before designs are finalised.

“We have a once in a lifetime opportunity to create a great waterfront and city centre, and we need the best designers working with us as we develop our proposals to transform this area,” Deputy Mayor and Auckland Development Committee Chair Penny Hulse said.

City Centre integration general manager Rick Walden, said the project was at a very early stage. “As options are developed we will be seeking input from the wider community.”

The council aims to complete the appointment of a design team in November. 

 That gives an idea of the process and the timeframe. Various bits and pieces of work for Quay Street have come and gone in recent years. The image below is from this previous Auckland Council work:

 No doubt this and other ideas will be available to those organisations that get through the Request for EOI process and are asked by Auckland Council to be the design team.

Transportblog has considered this image and its reading is that the image suggests the following:

• Shared space intersections
• Two lanes of traffic each way and no separate turning lanes at intersections
• A central planted median with trees
• Slightly widened footpaths
• No parking
• No Cycle Lanes

It looks to me as if the design visualised suggests significant changes at the bottom of Lower Albert as well. But it's useful to question what is in, and what is not in. What is up for change, and is it the change we need?

What Auckland Council is asking for:

The detailed text of Auckland Council's Request for Expressions Of Interest documentation is instructive. I have bolded particular sections:

Design and construction monitoring services are required for a transformation of Auckland waterfront area for the Quay Street Project. The project has both design and implementation stages.

Design and construction monitoring services are required for a transformation of Auckland waterfront area for the Quay Street Project. The project is estimated at 6 years in length with both design and implementation stages of the project. The Quay Street area of Auckland is the main welcome and arrival area for public from transport and tourism activities with Auckland Council wanting to transform the area to reinvigorate the Downtown and Waterfront area.

Summary

This Request for Expression of Interest process (REOI) seeks Expressions of Interest (EOI) from suitably qualified and interested consultants to enable a short list to be established by Auckland Council. Shortlisted participants from the REOI will be invited to respond to a Request for Proposal process (RFP) for the provision of design and construction monitoring services for the Quay Street Project.

This is a multi-disciplinary commission, and it is intended that a contract with one consultant, or lead consultant (in the case of a consortium), is to be awarded as a result of the RFP process that is to follow the REOI process. There is a preference for a design-led team with the ability to provide the management and skills required to deliver a design that meets the project brief and objectives.

If any consortia are proposed then details are to be included in the EOI. Any agreement entered into by Auckland Council as a result of the procurement will be with one contracting party, who may lead a consortium of major partners and a number of specialist sub consultants as required. Auckland Council will have the right to approve all subcontractors.

Non New Zealand resident International participation is encouraged, with a preference that these parties participate in association with a NZ resident practice.

The scope of professional services to be procured includes refreshed concept, preliminary and detailed design and construction monitoring.

Introduction and background

The Auckland Plan has identified the city centre, of which the waterfront is a critical component, as one of two key areas in the Auckland region requiring transformational change to meet the Mayor’s vision of making Auckland the world’s most liveable city.

Auckland Council’s City Centre Master Plan (CCMP) and Waterfront Auckland’s Waterfront Plan both identify the poor connections between the central city and waterfront. The proposal is to enhance both the north-south links from city to water, and create a grand urban axis in the east-west direction that connects the various parts of the wider waterfront. At the heart of the grand urban axis lies Quay Street. It is the central city’s ‘front yard’ and ‘welcome mat’ to the city centre for thousands of people on a daily basis.

Significant investment has been made in the Downtown precinct over the last 10 years. The council has made it a priority to transform Quay Street and the adjacent waterfront areas to help ‘unlock’ the surrounding destinations and create a stunning front door to a reinvigorated Downtown and Waterfront area.

The Quay Street Project responds to Council’s strategic direction for the Downtown precinct. It is funded by the 10 year CCMP Implementation Programme (2012-2022) and is being managed as part of the City Centre Integration Group (CCIG).

The project scope comprises of the following areas:

· Quay Street – between Lower Hobson Street and Britomart Place *
· Ferry Basin – water’s edge open space, adjoining Quay Street
· Ferry Building Promenade – open space immediately north of the Ferry Building
· Quay Street – between Britomart Place and Tangihua Street (Master Plan level).

The scope of professional services to be procured includes refreshed concept, preliminary and detailed design and construction monitoring.

There are numerous interfacing and interdependent projects and developments planned in the Downtown precinct. It is important that the Quay Street Project both leads and closely integrates with these.

Project Scope

The Quay Street Project scope includes:

· Quay Street – between Lower Hobson Street and Britomart Place
· Ferry Basin – water’s edge open space, adjoining Quay Street
· Ferry Building Promenade – open space immediately north of the Ferry Building
· Quay Street – between Britomart Place and Tangihua Street (master plan level)

Quay Street currently comprises six lanes of traffic and carries some 25,000 vehicles per day. Quay Street is used by general vehicle traffic, buses and some freight. 
A public transport “hub” is centred at the Quay Street/Queen Street intersection where there is access to the ferry terminal, the airport bus, taxis, coach services, and the Britomart bus and train stations. 
With the upgrading of Queen’s Wharf to be the primary cruise terminal, this intersection will see further traffic and pedestrian management challenges and will be of even greater importance in servicing this important transport hub.

The existing open space on the Ferry Basin water’s edge is provided by Piers 3 and 4, which adjoin the Quay Street seawall. Given the deteriorating condition of these existing piers, the proposal to seismically upgrade the Quay Street seawall and the Ferry Basin Master Plan’s proposal to upgrade and reconfigure ferry operations, it’s likely that these piers will be replaced with new wharf infrastructure.

Ports of Auckland Ltd are preparing a concept design for development of the Admiralty Basin water’s edge wharf area adjoining Quay Street. 

What I think is needed

This story is going to be around for a long time. So is Quay Street. So is Auckland. So are the other projects that this project will lead and integrate with. So I think it important that the scope we give the designers allows them to explore the big picture. And also to consider the staging of CBD regeneration required, and even what sort of governance arrangements need to be in place to give designers confidence that all aspects of their designs will be implemented - unlike the public good failure exemplified in Princes Wharf.

You will note from the REOI that it makes no mention of Downtown Precinct or of QE Square. Not in so many words. It doesn't mention Queens Wharf or Princes Wharf either. Which brings me there:

This picture is of the intersection between Hobson Street and Quay Street at Princes Wharf. (Thank you transportblog). It is a dangerous intersection for pedestrians. It's at the centre of the Auckland Council's envisioned Quay Street grand urban axis. I understand there's been some design attention paid to the intersection from Queens Wharf across Quay Street already (it's shifting a little east - but needs to be placed further east - see this posting). The REOI design scope does appear to include the Hobson Street intersection - but not any of the roads or uses off it - except Quay Street itself.

Now my last point. But before that, ask yourself this question: why did we build the Grafton Gully motorway connection with State Highway 1? In part this was to provide a direct road access for port truck traffic. But it also enabled traffic from Eastern Bays to bypass the Auckland CBD (if they were heading North), it also gave them direct access to Wellesley Street to access the CBD from that point of entry. A lot of design work has gone into making the links with Grafton Gully work better, so it is more useful for West and East bound traffic. For example see this posting in transportblog. The logic is remorseless surely. Plan Auckland's Waterfront CBD as a destination rather than a through route, and thereby make it a pedestrian haven.

Transport planning for the Auckland CBD needs a motto: to it - not through it

That's why it's the other end of Quay Street that's also key. My last point is summed up in this picture:

The Hobson Street ramp, with the Council carpark to the right. Any serious transformation of Auckland's CBD waterfront should include the removal of this ramp, and the redevelopment of the carpark building which would be rendered redundant by significant improvements in public transport.

The Hobson Street ramp will not be necessary when Quay Street is restricted to the two lanes of traffic shown in the artist's picture above.

Its removal would sharply increase the value and development potential of the municipal carpark land. Ramp removal would have other major planning benefits:

• it would free up lower Hobson Street for development
• the Princes Wharf intersection could be redesigned consistent with Quay Street's grand urban axis status
• the finer grain street network east and west of lower Hobson Street could be reinstated

What is needed is staged implementation of Auckland's urban waterfront regeneration. We don't want to restrict the thinking of the urban designers and planners who are stepping up right now. Think of the future.

And think of this area comprehensively. If you don't get my drift, look at this recent posting about Wellington waterfront planning - scroll down and look at the mapped scope of that planning in 1985 and 1987 when it was Gabites Porter and Partners that prepared the Lambton Harbour Combined Scheme for that area.

Other cities have made bigger changes. Make Auckland's CBD Waterfront a liveable place.

Auckland CBD & Waterfront Regeneration

It is appropriate that Auckland Council is managing a design process for the Quay Street area. One that recognises there a number of interconnecting and inter-relating projects. One that will be public.

This posting has been prepared to inform the need to design and implement an effective institutional process and structure that can reliably deliver designs, visions and projects that will make up the regenerated and transformed Auckland downtown CBD (projects include: Quay Street; QE Square; Queens Wharf; The Seawall; Ferry Terminal(s); Bus Interchange(s); CRL; connecting transport infrastructure).

These projects are the trigger for major urban regeneration of downtown/waterfront Auckland.

Section A serves as an introduction to this posting, and reports on various UK regeneration models, and compares them with what is happening in Auckland, and what model is being pursued by its different agencies (leading to potential for conflict, and need for change).
Section B reports on findings about how regeneration needs to be managed over the 10 to 20 years in can take. This looks at agency culture, management style and ways of working that contribute or detract from regeneration success. It raises questions about what needs to happen in Auckland to build an effective partnership.
Section C reports on the relationship between sustainability and regeneration, and how the ideas and objectives of sustainability can be used to lever regeneration policies and strategies.
And there's a biref conclusion.

A.    Urban Regeneration (Urban Regeneration in the UK, Tallon)

What has happened in Auckland following the transfer into new ownership (Ngati-whatua and Council) of redundant Ports land and wharves, rail-sidings, and the central railway station, follows a similar pattern to the urban regeneration transformations that have been re-shaping UK, USA and European cities following de-industrialisation, containerisation and subsequent globalisation forces.  The literature explicitly acknowledges that regeneration patterns in OECD countries around the world more or less follow that same set of patterns, and experience the same problems.

First comes the creation of a new CBD fringe of development opportunities, then comes a sequence of regeneration projects. In the UK these have been implemented in different periods according to three models:

1)    Urban Renewal in the 1970’s was public sector driven and mainly concerned with large scale redevelopment of inner city slum areas;
2)    Urban Regeneration in the 1980’s focussed on economic growth and property development, and used public funds to lever in largely undirected market investment (exemplified by London Docklands);
3)    Urban Regeneration in the 2000’s seeks to combine private and public sectors in partnerships to achieve regeneration but with an emphasis on sustainability and community inclusion

In Auckland CBD we are mainly proceeding in accordance with model 2 under Auckland Council’s ‘One Plan’ direction, and on the waterfront at Wynyard, we are proceeding with a mix of models 2 and 3. There are different priority emphases evident between Auckland's public agencies.

Turok (2005) identifies three distinctive features of modern urban regeneration:
1)    It is intended to change the nature of a place and in the process to involve the community and other actors with a stake in its future;
2)    It embraces multiple objectives and activities that cut across the main functional responsibilities of local government and its agencies;
3)    It usually  involves some form of partnership working amongst different stakeholders, although the form of partnership can vary.

I would observe that these three features generally define and describe the behaviour and function of Waterfront Auckland today, but do not describe the behaviour and function of Auckland Transport.

In terms of the nature of modern urban regeneration actions and activities, Roberts (2000) describes it as:
1)    An interventionist activity;
2)    An activity that straddles the public, private and voluntary and community sectors;
3)    An activity that is likely to experience considerable changes in its institutional structures over time in response to changing economic, social, environmental and political circumstances;
4)    A means of mobilising collective effort and providing the basis for the negotiation of appropriate solutions;
5)    A means of determining policies and actions designed to improve the condition of urban areas and developing institutional structures necessary to support the preparation of specific proposals.

Again, we see that these actions and activities describe the former Sea+City organisation transforming into the current Waterfront Development Agency and evolving to manage the particular challenges presented by urban regeneration. But they do not describe Auckland Transport which has not adapted to the changing environment. It is still deeply enmeshed in industrial thinking.

Waterfront Auckland models the Post Industrial.

By the late 2000’s, internationally, three approaches to urban regeneration have become apparent. Each is related to different policy approaches and emphasis, and can be summarised as coming under: urban renaissance;  social inclusion and economic competitiveness umbrellas:

1)    The Urban Renaissance agenda (subsumed now within the idea of ‘sustainable communities’) is concerned with physical and environmental conditions, linked with brownfield redevelopments and issues surrounding greenfield development. It promotes high quality urban design, mixed use environments and sustainable cities.
2)    The Social Inclusion agenda is focussed more on social conditions within deprived neighbourhoods, and encourages the development of social cohesion, social capital, and community participation to bring about the regeneration of community and neighbourhood.
3)    The Economic Competitiveness agenda is concerned with improving economic performance and employment by increasing output, productivity and innovation.

It could be argued that agenda 3 is the prime objective of Auckland Council (though its supports the compact city elements of agenda 1), while agenda 1 is the prime objective of Waterfront Auckland (though it is interested in the employment and innovation elements of agenda 3).

B.    Management of Regeneration (Management of Regeneration: Choices, Challenges and Dilemmas by Diamond and Liddle)

The preface in this text emphasises the fact that experience with regeneration projects and initiatives has led to a blurring of relationships and boundaries between state, market and civil society. It states that multi-agency partnerships are seen as the norm, and that the managers of regeneration have to work within this new framework and make sense of new forms of governance. It emphasises that old forms of hierarchy and organisational forms embedded in old structures are no longer appropriate for the dynamic of regeneration.
It talks about how managers of regeneration need to engage in ‘partnership mapping’ – to aid understanding of the complex web of social, political and personal natures of networks that the work is enmeshed with. And that managers of regeneration themselves are involved in transforming received understanding of local government networks.

This book echoes the sentiment expressed earlier, that regeneration activities are associated with changes in institutional forms to better engage with the needs. It states that “…emerging forms of local governance are not fixed… themselves are the sites of struggle and contest over how power over decisions is to be exercised…”

I would observe that we are seeing this contest now with CCIG (City Centre Integration Group), and who does what, and who decides what. We see it also in the evolution of HED into CCIG, and in the transformation of Sea+City into WDA.

The preface introduces the point that managers of regeneration find themselves negotiating  and liaising with range of local networks and groups, and find that “….all these groups share a common set of assumptions that they will each seek to shape the regeneration project in their definition of what is needed and how it is to be delivered….”

Further, that managers of regeneration “…will be seeking to create the space where they can do their own work, and another space for where consensus can be achieved….”

The preface ends with the point that the challenges of regeneration: “…can lead to a capacity gap – or generational gap – where the skills developed over past 20 years of old style local government are no longer appropriate…..”

B1. Context Setting

This is a brief analysis of what made regeneration initiatives succeed or fail. Key learnings include:

·    a very real problem for managers of regeneration and residents is to develop a shared picture of what the neighbourhood could be like over a 10 – 20 year time frame…
·    suggests there is a need to understand how a renewal or regeneration program represents a break with the past…
·    reasons for regeneration failure include: resistance from professionals; lack of an analysis of power; lack of community participation

Much of the UK context material is about ‘partnership’ with local communities and with stakeholders. What works. I note here that we haven’t even got there yet with CBD stuff (QE Square for example), we are still figuring how to engage with family (AT, AC, WDA), let alone organisations like Heart of the City, the Local Board. Regeneration strategies deployed in the UK and the USA lately include:

1)    The redevelopment of the inner core to make it attractive for investment and innovation;
2)    The depoliticization of service delivery through separation of their activities from local government (eg CCO’s etc)
3)    The promotion of the partnership model;
4)    And emphasis on managerialism instead of local politics.

The text notes that in this context the place and role of local community groups was marginalised.  This appears to be the area of change and shift now, as local communities form their own networks and alliances to act as a political counter-point to the regeneration managerialists. They argue for example (Clarke, 2004) for the need to reclaim the public realm. It is a development in regeneration for a role of civic society in decision-making processes.

B2. New skills & competencies
This is about the new skills that managers of regeneration need to have/adopt. “…not only are they taking on roles as community champions or leading change processes, but the increased need to work in partnership with communities or partners beyond their own organisational boundaries, and stimulate cultural changes, have implications on how they perceive their roles…”

This area is also about the significance of leadership in engaging stakeholders, and the: “….messy and ambiguous settings lead managers to attempt to make sense and develop some order and clarity…”. Best practice in the modern public sector environment now demands:

1)    Citizen involvement
2)    Greater democratization
3)    The need to build capacities and improve quality and performance
4)    A requirement for skills mixes located in different people at different times
5)    An understanding that no one organisation or person possesses all the skills and competencies to undertake activities
6)    Effective performance by regeneration managers, who synthesise past experiences, skills, knowledge, behaviours and competencies within organisational, but increasingly in cross-boundary, settings

The most significant take-away from this chapter is that regeneration demands a different way of thinking and behaving from public officials, and that they also need to respond and change in a dynamic and changing environment. Emphasis is placed on the need for organisational and managerial behaviours that “learn”, and that “public learning” requires a systematic approach to:

1)    Involve the whole system, develop a shared understanding of current realities and collective vision for the future;
2)    Develop questions on gaps between current and desired state, in order to agree publicly with stakeholders on the way ahead;
3)    Develop a climate or culture in the parts of their own organisations to gain commitment and combat coercion;
4)    Challenge  rhetoric of competition with collaboration and partnership;
5)    Place a high value on learning in human resource processes and performance and appraisal;
6)    Develop and value a learning ethos, discourage action fixated behaviours;
7)    Reinforce learning, discourage competition and short-term target setting, and incorporate into pay and reward systems.

B3.  Partnerships
The central claim for partnership working is the belief that it ensures greater coordination of existing provision and that it facilitates a sharing of knowledge between different agencies, which allows them to have a greater positive impact than they would if they worked separately. There is a further claim, suggesting that partnership working has the potential to change the working policies or culture both within and between participating agencies – this claim starts from the premise that such change is necessary. In addition, because the nature of regeneration activities is multi-faceted and a mix of social, economic and environmental – making the mix a so-called wicked problem – it goes beyond the capacity of any one agency and therefore partnerships are seen as the most effective way of addressing it/them.

There are ideas about necessary pre-conditions for effective partnership working. These are seen as key for a partnership:

1)    To set out clearly their aims and objectives;
2)    To establish shared criteria;
3)    To identify agreed mechanisms to review and monitor their work;
4)    To think through mechanisms for securing trust between agencies;
5)    To reflect upon ways of delegated tasks to specific groups/agencies;
6)    To address the issue of which staff (and why) will be involved.

There are also views about the factors which can be influential for a successful working partnership:

1)    Commitment to the concept at senior, middle management and operation levels as a prerequisite;
2)    Clarity of roles and powers;
3)    Clearly defined short-term aims;
4)    Embedded changes in working practices;
5)    Independent ‘broker’ to co-ordinate different agencies;
6)    Successful co-ordination at operational level.

Where these factors exist, then inter-agency working can:

1)    Lead to agencies being less reactive to local context;
2)    Focus resources available more clearly;
3)    Lead to changes in the management of partner organisations.

And that when these factors are present, and partnership agencies are responding and developing to the new environment, then partnership working has the potential to:

1)    Ensure greater co-ordinations between agencies;
2)    Facilitate the sharing of knowledge between agencies;
3)    Change the working practices and culture of agencies;
4)    Target resources more effectively;
5)    Address the multi-faceted problems inherent in regeneration.

However, experience suggests that none of the above may be practically possible to achieve if partner agencies don’t see the need for change, don’t reflect on practices that can change to make partnership more effective, and in short remain fixed in old ways of undertaking activities. Because of this risk, it is suggested that before seeking to engage agencies in joint work and recognising the benefits of such an approach, it is helpful to make the case for change within the different agencies/professional interest groups engaged in regeneration initiatives. UK experience indicates that the attractiveness of partnership working has often failed to grasp the complexities involved in the process of the management of change. Rather than suggest existing arrangements will lead to failure, it is more constructive to think about ways of enhancing individual agency capacities to engage in self-reflection and continuous learning. This approach recognises the need to acknowledge the presence of an organisational ‘culture’ in agencies which may inhibit changes in working practice and thinking, and risk the effectiveness of the partnership.

The text suggest a number of ways of doing this:

1)    Using external facilitators to help identify barriers to change;
2)    Bringing in ‘critical friends’ for points of reference;
3)    Activity using the skills and expertise of evaluators to help influence strategic and operational management;
4)    Reducing the levels of decision making;
5)    Supporting and promoting the role of local managers;
6)    Enhancing the role and status of supervision;
7)    Promoting and supporting decision-making at a local or team level;
8)    Deliberately setting out a policy and practice of staff development through external secondment and training.

This is a reminder: if we do what we've always done, we'll get what we've always got. And that ain't the best.

C.    Sustainability and Regeneration (Citing Tallon)

The urban regeneration agenda linked to sustainable development includes areas such as housing, communities, governance, climate change, energy consumption, economics, construction, design, health, land-use planning, natural resources and environmental limits, waste, transport, education and young people. Sustainable development principles are increasingly apparent at neighbourhood, local, regional, national and international levels, and especially focus now on cities.

A generally accepted set of requirements (12) of sustainable communities which resonates with the urban regeneration agenda is:

1)    A flourishing local economy to provide jobs and wealth;
2)    Strong leadership to respond positively to change;
3)    Effective engagement and participation by local people, groups and businesses, especially in the planning, design and long-term stewardship of their community, and an active voluntary and community sector;
4)    A safe and healthy local environment with well-designed public and green space;
5)    Sufficient size, scale and density, and the right layout to support basic amenities in the neighbourhood and minimise the use of resources (including land);
6)    Good public transport and other transport infrastructure both within the community and linking it to urban and regional centres;
7)    Buildings – both individually and collectively – that can meet different needs over time and that minimise use of resources;
8)    A well-integrated mix of decent homes of different types and tenures to support a range of household sizes, ages and incomes;
9)    Good quality local public services, including education and training opportunities, health care and community facilities, especially for leisure;
10)    A diverse, vibrant and creative local culture, encouraging pride in the community and cohesion within it;
11)    A ‘sense of place’;
12)    Links with the wider regional, national and international community.

The emphasis within most urban regeneration policies has tended to be on economic rather than environmental or social regeneration (see earlier). However, the promotion of inner city living since the 1990’s (later here in Auckland) to meet environmental and social ‘sustainability’  aims, as well as supporting economic regeneration, has been a key strand of urban regeneration policies, and indicates how the two dimensions of regeneration and sustainability are closely interrelated.
When assessing the effects of regeneration it is increasingly common practice to measure ‘sustainability’ because of the links that exist between regeneration and sustainability.  Experts now suggest an approach to assessment that specifically includes the environmental sustainability of the scheme alongside aspects such as financial viability, and the contribution to economic regeneration, community spirit and social cohesion.

 The Sustainable Development Commission (Europe) in the first action point of a 2003 report, indicated that sustainable development principles should be at the heart of regeneration policy and practice. Thus, although energy efficiency measures are at the forefront of thinking, social, economic and environmental impacts are all emphasised.

Conclusion



This will be brief. It is good to proceed with a design oriented investigation into Quay Street and environs. But it is not sufficient. Auckland has a bad track record of preparing public visions that capture the public interest and imagination, and then failing miserably in the delivery of that vision. Public good, public amenity, public space quality falls through the cracks in implementation. Private interests win. Public interests lose. That has been Auckland's CBD and Waterfront history for too long. There are changes in this pattern that are visible at Wynyard Quarter.

Institutional attitude change is needed throughout Auckland local government.

Whither Now Local Government?

Centrally driven growth OR Locally planned development?

State policy settings in New Zealand have emphasized national economic growth rather than local economic development since the 2007 Global Financial Crisis. Headline examples of this strategy include regulatory support for massive increases in irrigation and dairy farming, for mining, and for red-tape-free redevelopment of Auckland’s built fabric.

Territorial authorities have been made pawns in this game by local government legislation changes that drive institutional changes locally and ensure consistency with central government’s short-term emphasis. But there is a growing risk that the baby of good local government will be thrown out in reform bathwater.

I explore some of these recent reforms in this article, including the Auckland Supercity reform and its Unitary Plan. But first, because this is an election year, I start by canvassing the local government policies published by the main parties.

Labour says that it will:

·    Restore the four well-beings – the cornerstone of the Local Government Act 2002 - and the powers of general competence.
·    Establish a Central & Local Government Cooperation Unit dedicated to the development, promotion, monitoring and sustaining of partnership.
·    Restore the right of citizens to have the final say by way of a referendum on whether their Council is included in any proposed amalgamation.

The Green Party says that it will:
·    Reinstate the four wellbeings (social, environmental, cultural and economic) into the purpose of local government as originally specified in the 2002 Local Government Act.
·    Retain the power of general competence conferred to local government in the 2002 Local Government Act.
·    Develop national policy statements and national environmental standards under the Resource Management Act to provide better policy guidance to local government, promote national consistency and help reduce plan preparation costs.
·    Identify ways to guarantee greater protection and independence for local government within New Zealand's legal and constitutional framework.

More similarities than differences, but very different from National's policy. 

The National Party’s local government policy was the subject of PM John Key’s speech to the Local Government conference in July this year. He reminded delegates:

 “Our changes to the RMA will tackle housing affordability by freeing-up land supply…”,

National’s overall approach is summed up by this remark: “…we’ll be crowd-sourcing ways to reduce the rules and regulations that stop people doing sensible things with their own properties…”,

and by his announcement that his incoming government would: “…establish a Central Government and Local Government review group known as the Rules Reduction Taskforce….  will listen to local concerns and find opportunities to reduce and improve local regulation…. will root out local regulation that could be improved.”

The central point of this speech is the clarion call to: “reduce the rules and regulations that stop people doing sensible things with their own properties.” This is a classic plea and appeal to the idea of common sense.

But the longer I live the more I see - and the more I understand that common sense is not at all common.

Economics and Land Regulation

The right of individuals to control their property has long been recognised, but that autonomy is counterbalanced by the fact that property use sometimes must be regulated for the common good. The common method of land use control in New Zealand is zoning, which allows local government to divide territory into districts or zones where particular uses or activities are permitted or prohibited. Zoning, which became common in the early 20th century, is the foundation of the modern local system of land use control.

Any decision to regulate, not to regulate, to regulate less, has an economic effect. There are winners and there are losers. Regulation can increase property values, and it can decrease property values.

If Auckland's residential development market was operating as a truly free market, then it would typically be argued by economists that no local government intervention or regulation would be required. The basic presumption is that market processes work best to allocate scarce resources (eg land) in the most efficient way.

But that when competition is imperfect, the consequent “market failures” can and must be corrected by local government (or central government). Market failure is the standard justification for local government action in welfare economics. Economists generally use the term market failure to describe a situation in which the invisible hand (Adam Smith's "invisible hand of the market") fails to allocate resources in a socially desirable manner, so as to maximize aggregate economic well-being (another phrase for “common good”). Market failure arises when economic agents face incentives that are distorted leading to economic outcomes that are bad from society’s point of view.

So let’s look at National’s policy emphasis on freeing up land supply as a preferred intervention. It wants local government to release more greenfield land for urban development. It says that this is to address the issue of housing affordability. But is that the only reason?

According to a recent OECD study of 78 OECD metropolitan regions, Auckland had the third highest average annual population growth rate. And Auckland had one of the highest proportions of its population comprised of overseas-born residents, just behind Toronto and Vancouver. Auckland’s exploding population – from immigration and from internal migration - is the real pressure for greenfield development.

But this is not only a concern and policy priority for central government. Auckland Council has adopted a Spatial Plan named “The Auckland Plan” whose central economic target is: “to increase annual average real GDP growth from 3% p.a. in the last decade to 5% p.a. for the next 30 years…”.

That’s a huge increase.

Auckland Council is a Creature of Central Government

There have been many institutional and legislation changes since the GFC that affect the role of local government in New Zealand. The most significant of these was the amalgamation of Auckland’s local bodies into Auckland Council which was required to prepare a Spatial Plan. Legislation states that the plan:

79 (4) (a) must recognise and describe Auckland's role in New Zealand;

Which is not something local government had been required by statute to think about much before.

After all we’re Jafa’s aren’t we?

The spatial plan has adopted a target of 5% GDP growth for Auckland (recognising Auckland’s role in delivering Central Government’s economic strategy), that is largely to be achieved through high population growth and associated building development. It is a target that is to be delivered and implemented by other tools under council’s control including the Proposed Unitary Plan.

Ambitious growth targets like these that might not be a problem for existing residents if they didn’t have to suffer the consequences, or to subsidise the costs of that growth. But just as the deterioration of New Zealand’s rivers is apparently accepted as the cost of growth in dairy production, deteriorating urban neighbourhood amenity and increased rates to subsidise growth infrastructure will be a consequence for citizens of Auckland Council’s urban growth plans.

While I appreciate the concerns about amalgamation that are expressed in Green and Labour Party policies, I read nothing in there to alleviate the mess that Auckland has been legislatively levered into.

Getting Auckland out of the Mess

In 2006 McKinlay Douglas Limited undertook a major project for Local Government New Zealand. It advised:

“An extensive review of the experience of local government amalgamation, whether sector wide as with recent New Zealand, English, Australian State and Canadian provincial experience, or focused on individual authorities as with Halifax, is at best equivocal on the proposition that amalgamation will produce benefits in terms of reduced costs and/or improved services. The reasons include the normally unanticipated but common impacts of factors such as alignment of salary scales, incompatibility of systems or the need to upscale, staff morale, and the disturbance associated with major organisational change.”

How prescient. Auckland media is awash with reports about salaries, systems change costs, further organisational change costs etc.

The mess for existing residents includes dealing with the fallout from Council’s growth policies. By fallout I mean that the common good will be reduced. This is because Auckland Council’s Central Government inspired policies for more greenfield sprawl (to accommodate high population growth) will themselves cause market failure for at least two reasons:

1.      Infrastructure Subsidy Market Failure

When a new housing development is built, roads and sewers must be constructed, and facilities such as schools, parks, and community facilities. The market failure arises because, under current financing arrangements (which will be exacerbated by central government proposals to reduce development levies), the infrastructure-related developer levy burden on new homeowners will be less than the actual infrastructure costs they generate. The rest of the cost is shared among all of the city’s residents rather than charged directly to those who require the new infrastructure. And developers pocket higher profits. Thus, by undercharging new homeowners for the infrastructure costs they generate, the current Auckland Council plan to subsidise growth related infrastructure will inevitably incentivise more urban sprawl.

2.    Excessive Road Commuting Market Failure

Commuters incur substantial costs, which include the out-of-pocket expenses of vehicle operation as well as the “time cost” of commuting. Together, these out-of-pocket and time costs represent the “private cost” of commuting, the cost that the commuter himself bears. And when the commuter drives on congested roadways to get to work, another cost is generated above and beyond the private cost. This cost is due to the extra congestion caused by the commuter’s presence on the road - which everyone else has to "pay". We face this problem in Auckland now. Some traffic could be diverted to off-peak hours (like heavy freight), when roads are less congested. Some car commuters would switch to public transport if it met their needs. The problem with these solutions is that they encourage people to commute long distances, the solutions effectively say "what you're doing's OK", and unless there are congestion charges or some sort of toll, road users never have to face the true costs of excessive road use leading directly to market failure, and indirectly to more urban sprawl.

To finish - some numbers. Auckland’s Proposed Unitary Plan generated 93,600 primary submission points. These have generated a further 400,000 secondary submission points. With all the good will and competence in the world, how will the independent commissioners manage the process?

Thousands of submissions have come from residents and individual property owners concerned at what might happen to their asset. They are worrying about what they might lose, if someone is permitted (by the Unitary Plan) to do “sensible things” next door. This worry is human. But it is not taken account of in Auckland’s Unitary Plan. This assumes all that’s needed is a few rule changes and the market will sort things out. There is no implementation strategy, master plan, structure plan or any other process available for whole communities to be able to have a say and a role in how their community develops and changes, and what infrastructure will be needed.

Christchurch is an exemplar. Maybe it took a real earthquake (rather than a political one), but in that city Master Plans for whole communities are being carefully used with communities and residents and commercial property owners to redevelop, intensify and regenerate mixed use urban landscapes in Lyttleton, Sydenham, Linwood Village, Ferry Road, Sumner Village, New Brighton and Edgeware Village.

There the emphasis is on local development rather than economic growth.

That’s what is needed in Auckland.

That’s the local governance we need.

Wellington Waterfront Planning History

I spent Wednesday this week (6th August 2014) buried in Wellington archives investigating the influences, processes and events leading to what we experience on the Wellington Waterfront.

I will provide a few snippets here, though it will take a while before I get this history into the sort of shape I think it needs to be, so we can learn a few things.

1974

But first, in 1974 the then Chairman of the Wellington Harbour Board (WHB) released this little booklet. In this he describes the changing situation for WHB with containerisation. He describes the new reclamations underway, and makes this comment about the older areas of the port: "...this view of the future development of the harbour means that the Harbour Board will for all practical purposes vacate lands on the southern side of Lambton Harbour and will retain only the overseas passenger terminal, some lay-up berths to accommodate ships out of commission.... the land areas of Taranaki street and Jervois Quay could then be released for muncipal purposes. This will be of immense significance for the future of Wellington...."

O'Regan then goes on to argue that WHB should become a planning authority, in terms of the Town and Country Planning Act (TCP). He points out that in respect to reclamations, "...(1) The Crown has the final say in such work; (2)  other local authorities, interested organisations and the general public take no real part in the decision making process...."

He writes: "It can truly be said that the Harbour is Wellington and Wellington is the Harbour..."

1979

The Minister gave public notice, in terms of the TCP of his intention to establish the Wellington Harbour Maritime Planning Area (this was large encompassing the whole harbour out to Pencarrow Head), and called for submissions. Media reports at the time report that it was expected that WHB would be the planning authority for the area, which would appoint a maritime planning committee containing at least 3 from the WHB (from whose numbers would be the chair), a member from the Regional Planning authority, and representatives from "such other" local authorities as the authority and the minister agree. (You can see that Wellington City council was not explicitly included at this stage. About 5 different TLAs had boundaries with the new maritime planning area - but it was of greatest significance for Wellington City Council.)

1981

Wellington City Council planning staff raised concerns internally about being excluded, and representations were made to the Maritime Planning Committee about this, seeking to be included on the committee. The secretary for the Maritime Planning committee replied (25 June 1981):..." while recognising the particular importance of the planning relationship between harbour and Wellington City it must also be recognised that the harbour is a regional resource and that the maritime planning area has a common boundary with five district planning areas, and that as the Authority understands....etc etc, that the Act does not make provision for the separate or special representation of the Wellington City council....etc etc...aware of the special nature of the inter-relationship between the port, the harbour and Wellington City and will expect the formal public processes of developing an integrated regional planning scheme to be assisted and enhanced by a continuation of the less formal and ad hoc consultations between Council and Board that have proved useful in the past.... IE NO - WE DON'T NEED YOU ON OUR Committee!

This went public and both newspapers went into bat for Wellington City Council. On 27 June 1981 The Evening Post headlined: Council must fight harbour board snub, and wrote: "There can be no justification for divorcing the city council, which, in effect, is the voice of Wellington, from its right to a direct say in the future of such a priceless possession as the harbour...". It appears that as a result of representations, a Wellington City Councillor was appointed to the Maritime Planning Committee.

1982-1983

 During this period there were regular meetings of the Harbour and City liaison committee (which had WHB board members and WCC councillors, and staff). The Maritime Planning Committee (MPC) also sought "requests" from various authorities regarding public works and other projects or schemes that should be included in the Wellington Maritime Planning Area. By way of example, Wellington City Council sought inclusion of public walkways along the waterfront. By letter it was advised by the MPC: "...even though you did not include any justification for any pedestrian access in addition to that currently available, this will be referred to the WHMP Authority. Their consideration will be to balance your suggestion with the needs for safety of public.... etc"

1984

This was somewhat of a watershed year. The Wellington Civic Trust had been actively interested in the area for some time. In 1982 Harbour and City Liaison Ctte minutes record that the Civic Trust had offered to organise a design competition for the land: "with particular reference to the better land use of the interface between land and water...". It appears that diagrams had also been prepared by university students which had been presented to the Wellington City Council planning committee.

Significantly, The Wellington Civic Trust wrote to various authorities and individuals on 21 March 1984, inviting them to attend a two day Harbour/City conference to be  held at Michael Fowler Centre on 4th and 5th of July 1984. They write: "...we are trying to limit the subjects covered so that out of the conference a few important recommendations may be made to yourselves and the Harbour Board.....". The conference was chaired by Sir Frank Holmes.

The conference objectives were to achieve as much consensus as possible on:

1. The types, scale and timing of development which should be planned for Wellington's inner harbour;
2.  The organisational and financial methods by which the development can be implemented.

The conference appears to have been very carefully designed and managed with leaders chosen to facilitate sessions and arrive at a number of resolutions which were then provided to WHB and to Wellington City Council for their responses. I have listed these conference recommendations here:

Documentation exists recording how each body responded to this initiative.

1985-1986

This period saw intensive joint work between Wellington Harbour Board and Wellington City Council which culminated in a Joint Venture agreement prepared in association with Chapman Tripp Sheffield Young entitled the Lambton Harbour Development Project.

Under this joint venture agreement, the board and council:

• "agreed to cooperate in the production of a concept plan in respect of Lambton Harbour development....";  
• that the concept plan to "be approved in principle by the Board and Council";   
• that they "desire to proceed with the development...."; 
• that "parts of the land shown in the concept plan are vested in the board and other parts in the council..."; 
• that "in the interests of an integrated and balanced development the board and council wish to make available their respective lands to a joint venture....";  
• "it is the intention of both parties to implement the concept plan to the fullest extent in its provision of open spaces, recreational facilities and other amenities for use and enjoyment by the public which would not otherwise be achievable..."

And here is the map that went with that agreement:

You can click on it to see the detail. Of note is the idea that it describes a single "Combined Planning Scheme Area", and of course that the area is to be managed jointly by WHB and WCC. The combined planning area includes reclaimed land, wharves, and an area of sea.

1987

Gabites Porter and Partners prepared the Lambton Harbour Combined Scheme for the area. The cover of the document contains this conceptual rendering of the area, which includes various of the ideas that were included in, or envisaged by, that scheme:

For reference, I include here a Google image (obtained today) of the same area:

 1987-1991

There was a major financial crash in 1987. Recovery took some years, and not a lot of development occurred in the area. I will describe the period in more detail in a later posting. But what is of interest to the direction of this posting is what happened to all of this planning with the passage of the Resource Management Act in 1991.

1992

In 1992 a major review of the Lambton Harbour Combined Scheme was conducted. This was conducted by a large multi-disciplanry team of planners, urban designers, WCC councillors and WHB board members. It endorsed the aims and objectives of the 1986 study, and emphasised that the project needed to be implemented as a whole. The document contains a fascinating discussion about the implications of the RMA: how it would seek to draw an "arbitrary" line at Mean High Water Spring, "through the centre of the project". It makes strong statements about the need for implementation to be integrated in accordance with the combined plan.

Wellington worked together and obtained central government permission for this project to be planned and implemented in an integrated way, through jointly established agencies and mechanisms.

Rather different from the piece-meal, divide and rule approach we have suffered from, and continue to suffer from, in Auckland.

Making QE Square Successful

Yep. At it again. But this time I thought I'd start with some international best practice. If we want Auckland to be "most liveable" city, then best practice for parks and squares is not a bad place to start.

But before I get into that, I'm worried if the best Auckland Council can do, is what it is planning for Quay Street. You can see these plans on its website here. There's information about a possible pocket park. Auckland council provide this youtube video about the June experiment they ran for a trial pocket park on Quay Street. The image here is a still from that video. I won't comment about the successfulness or otherwise of this space till later in this posting.

These sorts of spaces have been established in various parts of Auckland. Add-ons after the main event. You can see a posting I did a couple of years ago about a couple of Faux Parks that were developed in Takapuna. They are exposed, unactivated, unattractive, eye-candy for motorists.


Old Auckland knew something about parks and squares, but new Auckland, post 1950's Auckland, has forgotten the art of public square making. For proof of this, look no further than Aotea Square, the extension to St Patricks Square, and QE Square itself. These failures should not be an excuse for the privatisation of QE Square now. What is needed is the application of landscape architecture and urban design skill. QE Square needs to be seen as a public opportunity for Auckland, rather than as a private opportunity for a developer.

International Square Best Practice

I've quoted here from a world best public square and plaza ranking by New York's Project for Public Places (the worst comes next). You can flick through the photos, and I've included their brief commentaries. Some are more relevant or pertinant to Auckland than others. You be the judge of that...

Grand Place | Brussels, Belgium
High density is what makes Grand Place works so well. There are various parks and green spaces close by, but Grand Place is surrounded by everything. There is nothing complex to its design; just a straightforward, strategically located gathering point that everyone loves.

Rynek Glowny | Krakow, Poland
With its multi-use Sukiennice as the centerpiece, Krakow's Rynek Glowny serves as the premiere local gathering spot. The immediate surroundings around this simple square consist of multi-use structures that vary in scale and form a diverse cluster of activity in the city center.

Trafalgar Square | London, England
Defined by its central location and its own landmarks, Trafalgar Square is a magnet for tourists and locals. The layout is stately but uncomplicated.

Plaza Santa Ana | Madrid, Spain
Plaza Santa Ana is smaller than nearby Plaza Mayor, but it is able to balance crowds along its edges (where the cafes and restaurants live) while also feeling comfortably open.

(This has similar scale to Auckland's QE Square - but you can see the difference it makes to have shops and cafes that activate the edge of this plaza.)

Federation Square | Melbourne, Australia
Visually, it is far from conventional. But this space adheres to the basic principles of creating great public spaces. It is easy to find, easy to navigate and serves as an escape from a very busy, high-density area. Approaching from surrounding streets, the short, and varied steps add visual depth as opposed to serving as an intimidating boundary.

Pioneer Courthouse Square | Portland, Oregon
Pioneer Courthouse Square has been successful mostly because of its central location downtown. But it is also enhanced by its own quirks. The public art adds charm and helps define the space. The steps lend themselves perfectly to public performances but also to a spur of the moment decision to sit down for lunch.

Hotel de Ville | Paris, France
 Surrounded by landmarks in a busy part of Paris, locals and tourists naturally gravitate to Hotel de Ville. The square is used creatively according to the season (providing green space in the summer and ice skating in the winter).

Old Town Square | Prague, Czech Republic
Old Town Square is surrounded by charming architecture, cobblestones, and anchored by a sizable and iconic statue. When you take into account its central location, there's no question why it is such a successful space.

Piazza Navona | Rome, Italy
Piazza Navona has charmed the world with its rich history and design. Everything about it makes it one of the best public squares you'll ever set foot in.

Failed Plazas and Squares

Diagonal Mar | Barcelona, Spain
There are extremely positive elements to this space, but it cannot quite compensate for its faults. The black iron fence is creatively designed but exaggerates the sense of separation as its forms resemble enlarged barbed wiring. The green space and the waterways are beautiful but the side of the park that faces the shopping center and Avingudal Diagonal lacks the kind of space and seating that encourage lingering.

City Hall Plaza | Boston, Massachusetts
Open space to this degree would seem like a good idea (especially pre-"Big Dig") but this plaza ends up feeling anti-social with its challenging series of steps and concrete surroundings. There are no lack of planned events here but it does not inspire spontaneous gatherings.

Exchange Square | Manchester, England
Exchange Square is far from unattractive but it is also far from perfect. The seating that is provided feels too structured, as if intended for scheduled events. Walls form as barriers along the charming pubs and restaurants by Cateaton Street. A missed opportunity for a truly vibrant space.

Place de la Concorde | Paris, France
Beautiful fountains and an even more beautiful obelisk make for a great space. But two rings of heavy auto traffic make for a more stressful journey than necessary. This stress is especially noticeable after a walk in the adjacent Tuileries Garden.

HUD Plaza | Washington, D.C. The seating and shelter islands have a vintage charm but HUD plaza is held back from some basic layout issues. In what was likely an attempt to not let the parking garage entry become intimidating, the path for cars is not distinct from the pedestrian paths. However, this makes one feel as if they are sharing the same space-a far from settling feeling for pedestrians. A wall forms at the sidewalk where cars emerge from the garage beneath, forming a barrier that makes you feel as if you have to cross another street just to find a place to rest.

Logan Square | Philadelphia, PA
This square certainly isn't lacking in beauty. But its auto-centric surroundings make it difficult to reach its potential as an ideal gathering space. Traffic calming measures have been put in place recently but the spaces that touch N. 20th and N. 18th are still your best bets for a serene public setting.

Schouwburgplein | Rotterdam, Netherlands Schouwburgplein was once an abject failure. After a 1997 redesign, it is now simply a public square that fails to live up to its potential. It opens itself up to the street but much of the spontaneous pedestrian activity only occurs along its sidewalks adjacent to more dense city blocks. Schouwburgplein still seems too spacious for its own good.

(This is reminscent of Aotea Square. Little going on at the edges. Large open spaces.)

Old Auckland Square Thinking vs Current Thinking

This is old St Patricks Square viewed from Wyndham Street. You can see the church, paving, and several small shops and cafes that front the square. Simple, elegant, very atttractive. (There are corners of QE Square that offer similar potential in the morning hours. Like cats we know where to go at different times of the day for the sunshine...)

And this is the new part of St Patrick's Square which was achieved by purchasing adjoining land. This addition is not unattractive. But you can see that the design is car friendly, rather than pedestrian friendly. And it lacks the intimacy and the elements that make public squares successful.

Come on Council. You can do better with QE Square than privatising it.